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II. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & CIVIL RIGHTS
Perry v. Leeke: The Constitutional Implications of a Court
Order Barring Consultation Between Defendant and Counsel
During a Fifteen Minute Trial Recess
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution entitles a
criminal defendant to the assistance of defense counsel.' The Supreme
Court of the United States has held that the sixth amendment right to
counsel is vital to the reliability of the fact finding process in criminal
trials. 2 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has determined that the sixth
amendment guarantees an accused the assistance of counsel throughout a
criminal prosecution. 3 The Supreme Court has determined that a trial court
order barring consultation between counsel and the accused during an
overnight recess violates the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel.
4
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that "[Iun all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." Id.
2. See Herring v. New York, 442 U.S. 853, 862 (1975) (citing as premise of adversary
system that partisan advocacy promotes reliable findings of fact). In Herring the United
States Supreme Court considered whether a New York statute making the opportunity for
closing argument subject to judicial discretion contravened the requirements of the sixth
amendment. Id. at 856-863. In holding that the trial court's power to deny counsel the right
to be heard in summation denies an accused his right to assistance of counsel, the Supreme
Court emphasized the importance of counsel's role in the adversary fact finding process.
Id. at 858, 862. The Herring Court observed that closing argument aids in the promotion
of reliable verdicts by clarifying the issues for the trier of fact. Id. at 862. Moreover, the
Supreme Court noted summation represents defense counsel's final opportunity to persuade
the trier of fact that reasonable doubt exists concerning the defendant's guilt. Id.; see Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) (finding access to assistance of counsel necessary to
integrity of trial); see also United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981) (noting that
purpose of sixth amendment right to counsel is to assure fairness in adversary system of
criminal justice); Anders v. California, 86 U.S. 738, 743 (1967) (finding that sixth amend-
ment adversarial process requires that criminal defendant have counsel as advocate).
3. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. In Powell three juries in Alabama state courts convicted
the defendants of rape. Id. at 50. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the convictions
and the defendants appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Id. On appeal the
defendants argued that the state court deprived them of assistance of counsel by failing to
appoint counsel prior to trial. Id. In reversing the convictions, the Supreme Court in Powell
held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that state trial courts
appoint counsel to assist defendants in preparation for state capital cases. Id. at 71. Because
a layman generally will lack the skill and knowledge of law necessary to adequately prepare
a defense and to establish his innocence at trial, the Powell court concluded that a criminal
defendant requires the assistance of counsel at every step in the criminal proceedings. Id.
at 69.
4. See Geders v. United States, 425 US. 80, 91 (1976) (holding that court order
barring consultation between defendant and counsel during overnight recess violated defen-
dant's sixth amendment right to counsel); infra notes 69-75, 80 and accompanying text
(discussing Supreme Court's decision in Geders).
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Moreover, the Court has concluded that an overnight bar order warrants
automatic reversal.' In Perry v, Leeke6 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit considered whether a court order barring consul-
tation between counsel and the accused during a fifteen minute trial recess
violated the sixth amendment.7 Further, the court questioned to what
degree, if any, the bar order prejudiced the defendant.8
In Perry a South Carolina grand jury indicted the defendant for
murder, kidnapping, and criminal sexual assault. 9 The defense called
numerous witnesses at trial, including the defendant, Perry. 0 After Perry
completed his direct testimony, the trial judge ordered a fifteen minute
recess.' During the recess defense counsel sought to speak with Perry,
but the trial judge refused to allow the consultation.' 2 The jury subse-
quently found Perry guilty of all three of the charged offenses. 3
On appeal to the Supreme Court of South Carolina, Perry argued
that, by denying him the opportunity to confer with counsel during the
fifteen minute recess, the trial court deprived him of his sixth amendment
right to assistance of counsel.' 4 The state supreme court rejected Perry's
argument, holding that the bar order did not unconstitutionally deprive
Perry of counsel's assistance. 5 More than four years after his conviction
5. See Geders, 425 U.S. at 88-92 (Supreme Court's automatic reversal in Geders). In
Geders the Supreme Court did not expressly establish a rule of automatic reversal. Id. The
Court, however, did reverse the defendant's conviction without inquiring into whether the
bar order resulted in prejudice. Id.; infra note 71 (discussing Geder Court's automatic
reversal).
6. 832 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 594 (1989).
7. Perry v. Leeke, 832 F.2d 837, 839-845 (4th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 594 (1989);
see infra notes 20-26 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's analysis of sixth
amendinent issue in Perry).
8. Perry, 832 F.2d at 843-845; see infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text (discussing
Perry court's inquiry into prejudicial effect of trial court's bar order).
9. State v. Perry, 278 S.C. 490, 491, 299 S.E.2d 324, 324 (S.C. 1983). The victim in
Perry had been sexually assaulted and shot to death. Id. at 491.
10. Perry, 832 F.2d at 839.
11. Id.
12. Id. Defense counsel sought to consult with Perry to remind Perry of his rights on
cross-examination. Id. The trial judge prohibited the consultation and explained to counsel
that Perry was not entitled to help or assistance concerning Perry's testimony on cross-
examination. Id.
13. Id.
14. State v. Perry, 278 S.C. 490, 491, 299 S.E.2d 324, 325 (S.C. 1983).
15. Id. at 493; 299 S.E.2d at 326. The Supreme Court of South Carolina observed
that the United States Supreme Court has held that an order precluding consultation when
defendant and counsel normally would confer violates the sixth amendment. Id. at 491, 299
S.E.2d at 325; see Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976) (holding bar order
preventing consultation when accused and counsel normally would confer unconstitutional).
The state supreme court in Perry attached great significance to the word "normally" and,
therefore, determined that, because counsel normally may not confer with the accused
between the accused's direct and cross-examination, the trial court did not deprive Perry of
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Perry sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court.' 6 The district
court granted relief, holding that any order barring consultation between
a defendant and counsel during a trial recess constitutes reversible error.'
The prosecution appealed the district court's order to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.'
On appeal the Fourth Circuit in Perry relied on an earlier Fourth
Circuit decision in United States v. Alien 9 to conclude that the trial court
unconstitutionally prevented the defendant from consulting with counsel
during the fifteen minute recess. 20 In Allen a jury in the United States
District Court for the District of South Carolina convicted the defendant
of transporting stolen merchandise. 2' The defendant appealed his convic-
tion to the Fourth Circuit. 22 On appeal the defendant alleged that the trial
judge violated the defendant's sixth amendment right to assistance of
counsel by forbidding consultation with counsel during two brief trial
recesses. 23 The Fourth Circuit in Allen held that the trial court's bar order
impinged upon the defendant's sixth amendment right to assistance of
counsel. 24 The Allen court explained that, because the right to counsel is
fundamental to a fair trial, absent compelling circumstances, any interfer-
his sixth amendment right to counsel. Perry, 278 S.C. at 492-493; 299 S.E.2d at 325-326.
The dissent in State v. Perry observed, however, that the bar order the Supreme Court
declared unconstitutional in Geders also occurred prior to the prosecution's cross-examination
of the defendant. Id. at 327; see Geders, 425 U.S. at 88-91 (finding overnight bar order
occurring between defendant's direct and cross-examination unconstitutional). The dissent
maintained that restricting the defendant's right to consult with counsel during any trial
recess violates the sixth amendment and warrants automatic reversal. Perry at 497, 299
S.E.2d at 328.
16. Perry v. Leeke, 832 F.2d 837, 839 (4th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 594 (1989).
17. Id. The district court granted relief on the basis of the Fourth Circuit's earlier
decisions in United States v. Allen, 542 F.2d 630 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 908
(1977) and Stubbs v. Bordenkircher, 689 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S.
907 (1983), both of which held that any order forbidding consultation between defendant
and counsel during a trial recess constitutes reversible error. Perry, 832 F.2d at 839; see
infra notes 20-25, 28-29 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's decisions in
Allen and Stubbs).
18. Perry, 832 F.2d at 839.
19. 542 F.2d 630 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 908 (1977).
20. Perry, 832 F.2d at 839. In United States v. Allen the Fourth Circuit considered
whether a trial judge may prevent a defendant from consulting with counsel during a brief,
routine trial recess. United States v. Allen, 542 F.2d 630, 632-634 (4th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 908 (1977). The Fourth Circuit in Allen concluded that the sixth amendment
right to counsel is so essential to a fair trial that courts may never interfere with the
accused's access to counsel's assistance during a trial recess. Id. at 633. The Allen court,
however, applied the new rule prospectively because the defendant neither objected to the
bar order nor alleged that the order resulted in prejudice. Id. at 634; see infra notes 21-25,
28-29 and accompanying text (discussing Allen).
21. Allen, 542 F.2d at 632.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 632-634; see supra note 20 (discussing Allen court's conclusion that bar
order violated constitution).
1989]
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ence with the defendant's access to counsel's assistance is constitutional
error. 25 Consistent with the Fourth Circuit's decision in Allen, the Perry
court held that the South Carolina court's order barring consultation
during the fifteen minute trial recess violated the defendant's sixth amend-
ment right to assistance of counsel.
26
Having found the state court bar order constitutionally impermissible,
the Fourth Circuit in Perry considered whether the error warranted au-
tomatic reversal of Perry's conviction.2 7 In Allen the Fourth Circuit
declined to establish a rule that requires the reviewing court to inquire
into prejudice on a case by case basis. 21 Instead, the Allen court concluded
that any order preventing communication between a defendant and his
attorney is presumptively prejudicial and necessitates automatic reversal.
29
25. Allen, 542 F.2d at 633. In Allen the Fourth Circuit noted the prosecution's
apprehension that defense counsel improperly might coach the defendant if the trial court
permitted consultation during a recess interrupting the defendant's testimony. Id. The Allen
court concluded, however, that unethical conduct usually is unlikely. Id. The Fourth Circuit
observed, further, that the prosecution can reveal the existence of improper coaching by
questioning the accused on whether defense counsel influenced the defendant's testimony.
Id. The Allen court concluded, therefore, that the sixth amendment right to counsel must
prevail over the danger of unethical conduct. Id.
26. Perry v. Leake, 832 F.2d 839, 839 (4th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 594 (1989).
27. Id. at 839-845.
28. Allen, 542 F.2d at 633. In Allen the Fourth Circuit concluded that a rule requiring
inquiry into prejudice on a case by case basis would exhaust the resources of reviewing
courts. Id.
29. Allen, 542 F.2d at 633-634. The Fourth Circuit in Allen noted that the concurring
opinion in Geders indicated support for a rule of automatic reversal in all cases when a
trial court unconstitutionally deprives the accused of counsel's assistance at a trial recess.
Id. at 634; see Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 93 (1976) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(finding majority's ruling that bar order unconstitutional fully applicable to any order
barring consultation at trial recess). In Geders, Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan,
interpreted the majority opinion to hold that any order forbidding the accused to consult
with counsel violates the constitution and that the defendant need not demonstrate prejudice.
Id. at 93.
In Stubbs v. Bordenkircher the Fourth Circuit upheld Allen and found that any bar
order constitutes reversible error. Stubbs v. Bordenkircher, 689 F.2d 1205, 1206 (4th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 907 (1983) (upholding Allen and finding any bar order reversible
error). In Stubbs the Fourth Circuit considered whether a trial court's bar order, preventing
the defendant from conferring with counsel during a one hour luncheon recess, deprived
the defendant of his sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel. Id. at 1205-1207. In
Stubbs a state trial court convicted the defendant of second degree murder. Id. at 1205.
The defendant sought habeas corpus relief in the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals,
alleging that the trial court unconstitutionally deprived him of counsel's assistance by
forbidding consultation during an hour-long luncheon recess. Id. at 1206. The court of
appeals denied the defendant's petition without comment. Id. at 1206. The defendant then
filed his habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
West Virginia. Id. The district court granted relief, holding that any order restricting a
defendant's access to counsel constitutes reversible error. Id. On appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit reversed the decision of the
district court and affirmed the defendant's conviction. Id. at 1207. The Fourth Circuit in
Stubbs agreed with the district court's determination that any restriction of a defendant's
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
The Fourth Circuit in Perry elected to replace the Allen rule mandating
automatic reversal with a rule requiring inquiry into prejudice on a case-
by-case basis.30 The Perry court reasoned that the United States Supreme
Court's decisions in Strickland v. Washington3' and United States v.
Cronic2 required the Fourth Circuit to consider the prejudicial effect of
the state court's bar order.
33
In Strickland the defendant pleaded guilty in a Florida trial court to
three capital murder charges.3 4 At the sentencing hearing defense counsel
elected not to present evidence of the defendant's character as a mitigating
circumstance." The trial court found numerous aggravating circumstances
and, therefore, sentenced the defendant to death.36 The defendant sought
appellate relief from his death sentence claiming, inter alia, that defense
counsel's ineffective assistance at the sentencing hearing violated the de-
fendant's sixth amendment rights. 37 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to establish the proper standards for reviewing courts
to follow when considering cases involving ineffective assistance of counsel. 38
access to counsel's assistance during a trial recess is unconstitutional. Id. at 1206. The
Fourth Circuit concluded, further, that when a court deprives the defendant of counsel's
assistance the defendant need not demonstrate prejudice. Id. The Stubbs court held, however,
that the defendant must show that the defendant desired to consult with counsel and would
have consulted with counsel but for the trial court's bar order. Id. at 1207. Because
defendant Stubbs neither objected to the bar order at trial nor demonstrated that he would
have consulted with counsel but for the trial court's restriction, the Fourth Circuit held that
the defendant had failed to show any deprivation of his right to assistance of counsel. Id.
The Fourth Circuit, therefore, affirmed Stubb's conviction. Id.; see also Bailey v. Redman,
657 F.2d 21, 23-24 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1153 (1982) (holding that defendant
must demonstrate that trial court's sequestrian deprived him of constitutional right he sought
to exercise).
30. Perry, 832 F.2d at 841; see infra notes 112-113 and accompanying text (discussing
Fourth Circuit's determination in Perry that courts should inquire into prejudicial effect of
bar order).
31. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
32. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
33. Perry, 832 F.2d at 839-843; see infra note 113 and accompanying text (discussing
Fourth Circuit's determination that inquiry into prejudicial effect of bar order in Perry was
proper); see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-691 (1984) (inquiring into preju-
dicial effect of ineffective assistance of counsel); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,
666-667 (1984) (requiring that defendant show prejudicial effect of ineffective assistance of
counsel).
34. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 672 (1984). In Strickland the state of
Florida indicted the defendant for kidnapping and murder. Id. The defendant, acting against
counsel's advice, waived his right to a jury trial and pleaded guilty to all charges. Id.
35. Id. at 672-673. In preparation for the sentencing hearing, defense counsel in
Strickland engaged in a limited investigation of the defendant's background and character.
Id. The Strickland court suspected that counsel decided not to present evidence concerning
the defendant's character to prevent the prosecution from cross-examining the defendant
and rebutting the defendant's claim of emotional duress. Id. at 673.
36. Id. at 675. The Florida Supreme Court in Strickland upheld the defendant's
conviction and death sentence on direct appeal. Id.
37. Id. at 678.
38. Id. at 684.
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The Supreme Court in Strickland explained that the sixth amendment
operates to ensure the accused a fair trial 39 The Strickland Court, there-
fore, concluded that to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that coun-
sel's inadequate performance undermined the reliability of the trial's result
and, thereby, deprived the defendant of a fair trial.40
In United States v. Cronic4' a jury in United States District Court for
the Western District of Oklahoma convicted the defendant of mail fraud. 2
The defendant appealed his conviction to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. 43 On appeal the defendant argued that
defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance and thereby impinged upon
the defendant's sixth amendment rights. 44 The Tenth Circuit reversed the
conviction, and the prosecution appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.45 As in Strickland, the Supreme Court in Cronic observed that the
sixth amendment protects the right of the accused to a fair trial.46 Ac-
cordingly, the Court in Cronic, like the Court in Strickland, held that to
succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance, the defendant must demon-
39. Id, at 689. A fair trial, the Strickland court found, is a trial which produces a
reliable outcome, Id. at 687.
40. Id. at 687-688. The Supreme Court in Strickland concluded that, even if counsel's
performance was substandard, the defendant had failed to demonstrate that any prejudice
resulted from counsel's performance. Id. at 698-699. The Strickland court found that
overwhelming aggravating circumstances supported the trial court's imposition of the death
penalty and, therefore, that counsel's errors, if any, were harmless. Id. at 700-701.
41. 466 U.S. 648 (1984),




45. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 at 650 (1984). In Cronic counsel that the
defendant had retained withdrew shortly before trial, Id. at 649. The district court appointed
a younger lawyer who had never participated in a jury trial and allowed new counsel only
twenty-five days to prepare for trial. Id. at 649, 665. The trial court convicted the defendant,
but the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the conviction. United
States v. Cronic, 675 F.2d at 1128-1129. The Tenth Circuit did not inquire into counsel's
actual performance. Id. Instead, the Tenth Circuit inferred ineffective assistance from the
circumstances surrounding the defendant's representation, particularly counsel's inexperience
and the time the trial court afforded for preparation for trial. Id.
46. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658. On appeal the Supreme Court reversed the decision of
the Tenth Circuit, finding that the Court of Appeals had failed to inquire into whether
defense counsel failed to provide effective assistance. Id. at 662-667. The Supreme Court
explained that the right to effective assistance of counsel is the right of the accused to have
counsel perform in a manner which will put the prosecution's case to a meaningful adversarial
test. Id. The Supreme Court noted that some circumstances are so likely to result in prejudice
that the Court will presume prejudicial effect. Id. at 658. The Court rejected, however, the
Tenth Circuit's conclusion that the circumstances presented in Cronic required the Court to
find that counsel was not able to render effective assistance. Id. at 663-667. Accordingly,
the Supreme Court held that reversal of the trial court was warranted only if the defendant
could demonstrate that counsel, in fact, performed so inadequately as to compromise the
defendant's right to a fair trial. Id. at 666-667.
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strate that counsel's deficient performance undermined the reliability of
the trial's outcome.
47
Observing the Supreme Court's emphasis in Strickland and Cronic on
the reliability of a trial verdict, the Fourth Circuit in Perry refused to
reverse Perry's conviction before inquiring whether the state court's con-
stitutional error contributed to the outcome of Perry's trial.4 The Perry
court reasoned that a trial error warrants automatic reversal only if the
error is so likely to cast suspicion on the results of the trial that the court
must presume prejudicial effect. 49 The frequency of communication be-
tween Perry and his defense counsel during the trial and the brevity of
the recess at issue led the Fourth Circuit to conclude that the fifteen
minute deprivation of Perry's right to counsel's assistance did not require
the court to presume prejudice.5 0 The court emphasized that defense
counsel ably represented Perry throughout the proceeding." Moreover, the
47. Id. at 658. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (1984) (holding
that in order to obtain reversal of the lower court conviction defendant must demonstrate
reasonable probability that counsel's errors impinged upon defendant's right to fair trial).
48. Perry v. Leeke, 832 F.2d 837, 841-845 (4th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 594 (1989).
49. Id. at 841-843. The Fourth Circuit in Perry rejected a rule of automatic reversal,
reasoning that the Supreme Court's analysis of the sixth amendment in Strickland and
Cronic required the Perry court to inquire into the prejudicial effect of the state court's bar
order. Id. In Strickland and Cronic, the Fourth Circuit observed, the Supreme Court
determined that the sixth amendment simply assures the accused a fair trial. Id. at 841; see
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (finding that purpose of sixth amendment is to ensure fair trial);
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658 (recognizing that right to counsel affects ability of accused to
receive fair trial). The Fourth Circuit concluded that the state court's bar order did not
sufficiently implicate the reliability of Perry's conviction and, thereby, Perry's right to a
fair trial, to require automatic reversal. Perry, 832 F.2d at 842; see infra notes 50-52 and
accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's conclusion in Perry that bar order was not
per se prejudicial).
50. Perry, 832 F.2d at 843. The Fourth Circuit noted that Perry had the opportunity
to consult with counsel during an overnight recess on the evening before his testimony. Id.
at 841. The Perry court observed, further, that the defendant had access to counsel during
a luncheon recess immediately prior to this testimony and again during a recess occurring
in the midst of his testimony. Id. The Perry court emphasized that the recess at issue not
only was brief but occurred by chance between the defendant's direct and cross-examination.
Id. at 842. The Fourth Circuit concluded that it would be improper to reverse Perry's
conviction automatically simply because the trial court deprived Perry of counsel's assistance
during one brief, unanticipated recess. Id.; see infra notes 51-53, 112-113 and accompanying
text (discussing Perry court's decision to inquire into prejudicial effect of bar order).
51. Perry, 832 F.2d at 841, 843-844. The Fourth Circuit in Perry observed that the
defendants in Strickland and Cronic claimed that incompetent counsel represented them at
trial. Id. at 841; see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 675 (discussing defendant's claim that defense
counsel rendered ineffective assistance); Cronic, 466 U.S. at 650 (same). The Perry court
asserted that depriving a defendant of adequate assistance throughout trial is far more likely
to result in prejudice than the relatively minor deprivation in Perry. Perry, 832 F.2d at 841.
The Fourth Circuit observed that the Supreme Court in Strickland and Cronic, nevertheless,
held inquiry into prejudice proper in cases involving ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.;
see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (holding that defendant must demonstrate prejudicial effect
of counsel's ineffective assistance); Cronic, 466 U.S. at 666-667 (same). The Perry court
1989]
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Fourth Circuit noted that eleven recesses had occurred during Perry's trial
and that the court had permitted Perry and counsel to consult during all
but the brief recess at issue.5 2 The Fourth Circuit concluded, therefore,
that the trial court's constitutional error did not sufficiently implicate the
reliability of Perry's conviction to warrant automatic reversal. 3 Having
found inquiry into the prejudicial effect of the state court's bar order
proper, the Fourth Circuit considered whether the bar order resulted in
prejudice to Perry's defense.54 The Perry court relied on the standards the
Supreme Court established in Strickland and Cronic to conclude that Perry
had failed to demonstrate that the bar order contributed to Perry's
conviction.5 5 The sufficiency of defense counsel's performance and over-
whelming evidence indicating Perry's guilt led the Fourth Circuit to hold
that the trial court's constitutional error did not result in prejudice to the
defendant.5 6 The Perry dourt found no reason to conclude that any
communication that might have taken place during the fifteen minute
recess would have altered the outcome of the trial.5 7 The Fourth Circuit,
maintained that it would be incongruous to automatically reverse Perry's conviction because
the trial court denied access to counsel during a brief recess but, nevertheless, inquire into
prejudice had defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance throughout the proceedings.
Perry, 832 F.2d at 841. The Fourth Circuit concluded, therefore, that defense counsel's able
representation of Perry belied a conclusion that the state court's bar order was presumptively
prejudicial. Id. at 841-842.
52. Perry, 832 F.2d at 842.
53. Id. at 842-843. The Fourth Circuit in Perry noted that a habeas court serves the
limited purpose of focusing upon the fairness of the proceedings at issue. Id. at 842-843.
The court explained that collateral review and reversal of state convictions undermines the
finality of convictions and imposes enormous costs on both the state and federal systems
of criminal justice. Id. at 843. Further, the court observed that retrials often lack the
reliability of the initial trial due to passage of time, lapses of memory, and erosion of
evidence. Id. The Fourth Circuit explained that Perry's case presented a particular risk of
such problems because Perry filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus more than four
years after his original trial. Id. While the Perry court conceded that prejudicial error would
require a retrial regardless of retrial costs and infirmities, the Fourth Circuit concluded that
automatic reversal is improper when, as in Perry, the error was not presumptively prejudicial.
Id.
54. Id. at 843-845.
55. See id. (finding that state court's bar 6rder in Perry did not undermine reliability
of trial verdict).
56. Id. In Perry the Fourth Circuit determined that a fair trial is one in which the
prosecution's evidence is subject to a sufficient adversarial testing by defense counsel and
is presented t6 an impartial tribunal for the determination of the issues. Id. at 843. The
Fourth Circuit concluded that the trial court's bar order did not undermine the reliability
of the verdict obtained at Perry's trial. Id. at 843-845; see supra notes 50-51 and accom-
panying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's conclusion that sufficiency of counsel's assistance
and frequent access to counsel indicated that defendant in Perry received fair trial); infra
note 130 and accompanying text (discussing Perr, court's finding that overwhelming evidence
of defendant's guilt supported conclusion that trial error was harmless).
57. Perry, 832 F.2d at 843-845. The Fourth Circuit observed that Perry performed
well on cross-examination and effectively related his version of events to the jury. Id. at
841 n.2, 843. The Perry court concluded, therefore, that the state court's bar order did not
compromise Perry's ability to present his defense and, thereby, undermine the reliability of
the trial verdict. Id. at 843-845.
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therefore, upheld Perry's conviction. 5s The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari.5 9
While the Perry majority inquired into whether the state court's bar
order resulted in prejudice, Judge Winter in dissent supported a rule of
automatic reversal. 60 The dissent argued that the majority erroneously
concluded that the Supreme Court's decisions in Strickland and Cronic
required the Fourth Circuit to consider whether the bar order resulted in
prejudice. 61 In Strickland and Cronic, the Perry dissent noted, the Supreme
Court determined that once an attorney has assisted a criminal defendant,
the Court will presume that counsel has performed with reasonable com-
petency.62 This presumption, the Perry dissent explained, enables the Court
to avoid post hoc evaluation of counsel's strategic decisions. 63 The dissent
asserted, however, that the Supreme Court's presumption in Strickland
and Cronic that counsel rendered effective assistance applies only when
counsel has had the opportunity to perform. 4 In Cronic, the Perry dissent
observed, the Supreme Court recognized that because assistance of counsel
is necessary to a fair trial, a deprivation of the right to counsel at a
critical stage of the trial requires the Court to conclude that the trial was
unfair.6- The dissent in Perry maintained that any trial recess is a critical
58. Id. at 845.
59. Perry v. Leeke, 108 S. Ct. 1269 (1988).
60. Perry, 832 F.2d at 845-850; see infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text (discussing
Perry dissent's support for rule of automatic reversal).
61. Perry, 832 F.2d at 845-848 (Winter, J. dissenting). Judge Winter, dissenting in
Perry, argued that the Supreme Court's decisions in Strickland and Cronic neither modified
nor overruled the Fourth Circuit's holdings in United States v. Allen and Stubbs v.
Bordenkircher. Id. at 846-850. The dissent noted that unlike Allen and Stubbs, the defendants
in Strickland and Cronic had full access to counsel. Id. at 846. The Perry dissent observed
that in Strickland, the Supreme Court stated that actual denial of assistance of counsel is
presumptively prejudicial and warrants automatic reversal. Id. at 847.
Judge Murnaghan, also dissenting in Perry, supported Judge Winter's opinion and
explained that the sixth amendment guarantees the accused the right to effective assistance
of counsel. Id. at 852. It follows, Judge Murnaghan reasoned, that when the court deprives
the defendant of access to his attorney, counsel's assistance is ineffective. Id. Judge
Murnaghan explained that defense counsel clearly cannot render effective assistance when
denied the opportunity to assist at all. Id.; see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 692
(noting that denial of counsel is per se prejudicial).
62. Perry, 832 F.2d at 845, 847-848; see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (citing presumption
of effective assistance of counsel); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984) (same).
63. Perry, 832 F.2d at 848. The dissent noted the Supreme Court's reluctance in
Strickland to engage in pervasive post-trial inquiry to determine whether defense counsel
performed adequately. Id.; see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-690 (noting that judicial scrutiny
of attorney performance must be deferential). In Strickland the Supreme Court recognized
the difficulty of assessing counsel's performance after a trial. Id. at 689. The Strickland
court explained that there are countless ways to present a defense in any particular case.
Id. The Supreme Court, therefore, expressed fear that extensive post-hoc evaluation of
attorney performance would stifle independent advocacy. Id. at 690.
64. Perry, 832 F.2d at 847-848.
65. Id. at 847. See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 (presumption that counsel's assistance is
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stage of the trial. 66 The Perry dissent, therefore, concluded that the state
court's fifteen minute deprivation of Perry's right to counsel was per se
prejudicial and that the majority should have reversed Perry's conviction. 67
The Fourth Circuit in Perry correctly held that the state court's bar
order unconstitutionally deprived the defendant assistance of counsel.
68
While the Supreme Court has not determined whether an order forbidding
consultation during a brief routine recess violates a defendant's sixth
amendment right to assistance of counsel, the Court's holding in Geders
v. United States69 indicates that any restriction of a defendant's access to
counsel during a trial recess is unconstitutional. 70 In Geders the Supreme
Court considered whether an order precluding defendant and counsel from
communicating during a seventeen hour overnight recess violated the
defendant's rights under the sixth amendment. 71 While the recess and bar
essential requires court to conclude that trial unfair if the court deprives the accused of
counsel's assistance). The Supreme Court in Cronic explained that counsel must subject the
prosecution's case to sufficient adversarial testing to justify reliance on the outcome of the
trial. Id. The Cronic court observed, therefore, that if a court denies counsel the opportunity
to participate fully in criminal proceedings, the court renders the adversary fact finding
process presumptively unreliable and makes automatic reversal necessary. Id.
66. Perry, 832 F.2d at 848-849.
67. Id. at 850. The dissent rejected the case-by-case analysis that the majority rule
would necessitate. Id. at 849. The dissent contended that a per se rule of reversal is easier
to administer and best protects the defendant's sixth amendment right to assistance of
counsel. Id. at 850. In the majority's view, the dissent noted, a dividing line exists above
which all deprivations of counsel are per se prejudicial and below which they are potentially
harmless. Id. at 849. The dissent asserted that divination of that dividing line is virtually
impossible without arbitrary selection or time consuming case-by-case inquiry. Id.
68. See infra notes 69-82 and accompanying text (discussing propriety of Fourth
Circuit's holding in Perry that bar order violated sixth amendment).
69. 425 U.S. 80 (1976).
70. See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976) (holding order barring consul-
tation between accused and counsel during overnight trial recess violates defendant's right
to assistance of counsel); infra notes 71-75, 78-81 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme
Court's decision in Geders).
71. Geders, 425 U.S. at 81-91. In Geders a grand jury in the Middle District of Florida
indicted the accused for illegal importation of a controlled substance into the United States.
Id. at 81-82. The defendant testified at trial. Id. at 82. Following the defendant's direct
testimony the trial court recessed for the night. Id. The trial judge directed the defendant
not to consult with his attorney during the overnight recess. Id. The jury subsequently
convicted the defendant, and the defendant appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit. Id. at 85.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court deprived him of his sixth
amendment right to assistance of counsel by forbidding consultation during the overnight
recess. Id. at 85-86. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant's
failure to allege that the bar order resulted in prejudice was fatal to the appeal. Id. at 86.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Geders v. United States, 421 U.S. 929
(1975).
The Supreme Court in Geders held that an order that prevents consultation at a time
when defendant and counsel would expect the opportunity to confer contravenes the
requirements of the sixth amendment. Geders, 425 U.S. at 91. Accordingly, the Geders Court
held that the trial court's bar order preventing consultation during an overnight recess, a
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order in Geders took place between the defendant's direct and cross-
examination, a juncture at which defendant and counsel normally would
not have the opportunity to consult, the Geders Court concluded that the
seventeen hour deprivation impinged upon the defendant's right to assis-
tance of counsel. 72 The Supreme Court explained that defendant and
counsel typically communicate during an overnight recess. 73 Furthermore,
the Geders Court emphasized that an overnight recess can be vital to the
defense as it affords the accused and counsel an opportunity to discuss
the day's events and to formulate strategies for the remainder of trial. 74
In finding the trial court's overnight bar order unconstitutional, the
Supreme Court in Geders stressed the considerable length of the recess at
issue .7 The length of an order precluding consultation, however, alone
should not determine whether the resulting deprivation amounts to an
error of constitutional magnitude. 76 Instead, the reviewing court must
determine whether the sixth amendment entitles the accused to the assis-
tance of counsel at every trial recess.77 The Supreme Court in Geders
observed that a criminal defendant often must consult with counsel during
the course of a trial.78 The Geders Court explained that counsel's assistance
is necessary to a fair trial because the accused generally lacks familiarity
with the intricacies of the law and the process of trial. 79 While noting the
trial court's fear that during a recess defense counsel improperly might
influence the defendant's testimony, the Supreme Court in Geders con-
cluded that the defendant's sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel
must prevail over the danger of unethical conduct.80 Recognizing the
juncture during trial when defendant and counsel normally would confer, violated the
defendant's sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel. Id. at 91-92. The Supreme Court
reversed the defendant's conviction without inquiring into prejudicial effect of the trial
court's bar order. Id. at 88-91.
72. Geders, 425 U.S. at 88-91.
73. Id. at 88.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 88, 89, 91. In Geders the Supreme Court frequently alluded to the length
of the deprivation resulting from the trial court's bar order. Id. The overnight trial recess
lasted seventeen hours. Id.
76. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text (suggesting that length of deprivation
of assistance of counsel is inconsequential to issue of constitutionality).
77. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text (discussing right of accused to
assistance of counsel at every trial recess).
78. Geders, 425 U.S. at 88.
79. Id. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-345 (1963) (finding counsel's
assistance necessary to protect constitutional right of accused to fair trial); Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932) (recognizing that accused requires guiding hand of
counsel throughout criminal prosecution); supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text (discussing
importance of counsel's assistance to reliability of trial verdict).
80. Geders, 425 U.S. at 91. The Supreme Court in Geders noted that the trial court
may use means other than depriving the accused of counsel's assistance to deal with possible
improper coaching. Id. at 89-91. For instance, the Supreme Court explained, a prosecutor
may cross-examine the defendant as to whether coaching took place during the trial recess.
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importance of defense counsel's role at trial, the Geders opinion suggests
that any interference with the defendant's access to counsel's assistance
during a trial recess, regardless of the brevity of the recess, violates the
constitution." The Fourth Circuit in Perry, therefore, properly concluded
that the state court's order forbidding consultation during the fifteen
minute trial recess deprived Perry of his sixth amendment right to assis-
tance of counsel.
82
While the Fourth Circuit's conclusion in Perry that the bar order
violated the defendant's sixth amendment rights accords with Supreme
Court precedent, conflicting authority exists concerning the Perry court's
inquiry into whether the error resulted in prejudice." In United States v.
Bryant84 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit did not
examine prejudicial effect in considering the constitutionality of a trial
court's bar order.8 In Bryant a jury in the United States District Court
Id. at 89-90. Add itionally, the Geders court noted, if the trial court suspects that defense
counsel will engage in unethical conduct, the court may require that cross-examination of
the defendant follow direct examination without interruption. Id. at 90.
81. See id. at 92-93 (concurring opinion in Geders interpreting majority's decision to
hold that any order precluding consultation during trial recess is unconstitutional). The
Supreme Court in Geders expressly limited its holding to an order barring consultation
during a seventeen hour overnight recess. Id. at 89 n.2, 91. The Geders court declined to
consider the constitutional implications of an order precluding consultation during a brief
routine recess. Id. The concurring opinion in Geders maintained, nevertheless, that any
order barring communication between counsel and the accused violates the constitution. Id.
at 92-93. The Geders concurrence reasoned that a defendant's right to counsel prevails over
the danger of improper coaching at trial recess, regardless of the brevity of the recess. Id.
82. Perry, 832 F.2d at 839.
83. See United States v. Conway, 632 F.2d 641, 644-645 (5th Cir. Unit B 1980) (holding
order barring consultation requires automatic reversal). In Conway the trial court ordered
the defendant not to speak with his attorney during a luncheon recess that interrupted the
defendant's cross-examination. Id. at 643. The Fifth Circuit held that the bar order denied
the accused his sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel. Id. at 645. The Fifth Circuit
reversed the conviction without considering whether the bar order resulted in prejudice. Id.
at 644-645.
In Jackson v. United States the District of Columbia Court of Appeals considered
whether a trial court order preventing the defendant from consulting with his attorney
during a luncheon recess deprived the defendant of his sixth amendment right to counsel.
Jackson v. United States, 420 A.2d 1202, 1205 (D.C. 1979) (deprivation of right to counsel
at critical stage requires automatic reversal). After the defendant completed his direct
testimony, the trial court called a luncheon recess and instructed the defendant not to
communicate with his attorney. Id. at 1203. The jury subsequently convicted the defendant
of armed robbery, robbery, and assault with a deadly weapon. Id. On appeal the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the trial court's order violated the defendant's
right to counsel. Id. The court of appeals concluded, further, that any deprivation of the
defendant's right to assistance of counsel at a critical stage in the proceedings requires
automatic reversal. Id. at 1203-1205. The Jackson court declined to distinguish Geders on
the basis of the length of the deprivation, concluding, instead, that any order preventing
consultation is presumptively prejudicial. Id. at 1204. Accordingly, the Jackson court reversed
the defendant's conviction. Id. at 1203-1205.
84. 545 F.2d 1035 (6th Cir. 1976).
85. United States v. Bryant, 545 F.2d 1035, 1035-1036 (6th Cir. 1976).
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for the Southern District of Ohio convicted the defendant of armed bank
robbery and possession of unregistered firearms. s6 The defendant appealed
to the Sixth Circuit, arguing that the trial court violated the defendant's
sixth amendment rights by barring consultation with counsel during a one-
hour noon recess.8 7 The Bryant court observed that the Supreme Court in
Geders expressly limited its holding to a seventeen hour overnight recess."
The Sixth Circuit held, nevertheless, that the Geders decision and its rule
of automatic reversal applied to an hour-long luncheon recess.8 9 Accord-
ingly, the Bryant court held that the trial court's bar order unconstitu-
tionally deprived the defendant of counsel's assistance and reversed the
conviction without inquiring into whether the error resulted in prejudice.90
In contrast to the Sixth Circuit's holding in Bryant the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States
v. DiLapP is consistent with the Fourth Circuit's inquiry into prejudice
in Perry.92 In DiLapi a jury in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York convicted the defendant of obstruction of
justice and conspiracy. 93 The defendant appealed to the Second Circuit.
94
On appeal the defendant argued that the trial court violated the defendant's
sixth amendment rights by forbidding consultation with counsel during a
five minute recess. 95 While holding that any order precluding communi-
cation during a trial recess is constitutional error, the Second Circuit
affirmed the conviction.9 6 The DiLapi court reasoned that reversal of the
defendant's conviction was unwarranted because the bar order did not
result in even a remote risk of prejudice. 97
86. Id. at 1035.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1036. See Geders, 425 U.S. at 89 n.2, 91 (limiting decision to hold order
barring consultation during overnight recess unconstitutional to specific facts at bar).
89. Bryant, 545 F.2d at 1036. In Bryant the Sixth Circuit conceded that the Supreme
Court in Geders expressly declined to pass on the proper disposition of an order prohibiting
consultation during a brief routine recess. Id. Reasoning that the sixth amendment entitles
the accused to counsel's assistance throughout trial, the Bryant court found, nevertheless,
that Geders applied to an hour-long lunch recess. Id.
90. Id.
91. 651 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982).
92. United States v. DiLapi, 651 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938
(1982).
93. Id. at 142.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 142, 147-148.
96. Id. at 148-149. In DiLapi the defendant urged the Second Circuit to apply Geders
and reverse without inquiring into prejudice. Id. at 148. The Second Circuit agreed that the
bar order violated the defendant's right to assistance of counsel but refused to reverse. Id.
The court reasoned that the error was insignificant and, therefore, harmless. Id.
97. Id. The Second Circuit in DiLapi found the trial error harmless despite the
defendant's contention that he needed to speak with counsel concerning a severance the trial
court granted to the defendant's co-defendant. Id. at 148. The Second Circuit reasoned that
the severance had occurred earlier in the day and, therefore, the defendant had full
1989]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:467
The Fourth Circuit correctly concluded that the trial error in Perry
warranted inquiry into prejudice." The Supreme Court has held that not
all constitutional errors require automatic 'reversal.99 In Chapman v.
California'00 the Supreme Court determined that in the setting of a par-
ticular case, a constitutional infirmity may prove so insignificant to the
outcome of the trial that reversal is unnecessary.10' In Chapman a jury in
a California state court convicted the defendants of robbery, kidnapping,
and murder. 0 2 On appeal to the California Supreme Court the defendants
argued that the prosecution's comments to the jury concerning the defen-
dants' failure to testify violated the fifth amendment. 103 The California
Supreme Court conceded the constitutional error but, applying the state
constitution's harmless error provision, upheld the convictions. 0 4 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 105
The United States Supreme Court in Chapman recognized that the
prosecution's conduct violated the defendants' rights under the fifth
amendment to the United States Constitution.0 6 The Chapman Court,
however, rejected the defendants' contention that denial of a federal
constitutional right, no matter how insignificant to the outcome of the
trial, requires automatic reversal. 0 7 Instead, the Supreme Court in Chap-
man held that a constitutional error is harmless if the reviewing court
finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in question did not
contribute to the verdict obtained at trial.'0 ' The Court cautioned, however,
opportunity to discuss the matter with his attorney prior to the brief recess in question. Id.
The DiLapi court found no reason to conclude that five additional minutes of communication
would have had any bearing on the defendant's cross-examination. Id. The Second Circuit
noted, however, that it was not deciding whether an order barring consultation would require
automatic reversal in subsequent cases. Id. at 149. The court indicated, therefore, that in
future cases the Second Circuit might presume the prejudicial effect of a bar order that, in
the court's opinion, encompasses a greater deprivation of the defendant's sixth amendment
right to counsel. Id.
98. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's inquiry
into prejudice); infra notes 112-113 and accompanying text (same).
99. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967) (determining that some consti-
tutional errors may not sufficiently affect substantial rights of defendant to warrant auto-
matic reversal).
100. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
101. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).
102. Id. at 19.
103. People v. Teale, 63 Cal. 2d 178, -, 404 P.2d 209, 220, 45 Cal. Rptr. 729, 740
(1965), rev'd, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
104. Teale, 63 Cal. 2d at -, 404 P.2d at 220-221, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 740-741.
105. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 20.
106. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 21. In Chapman the Supreme Court recognized that the
state's attorney violated the defendants' fifth amendment rights by making numerous
comments to the jury regarding the defendants' failure to testify. Id. at 19. See Griffen v.
State of California, 380 U.S. 609, 613-615 (1965) (holding that-comments to jury concerning
defendant's failure to testify violates self-incrimination clause of fifth amendment).
107. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22.
108. Id. at 24. In the interest of preserving reliable verdicts, the Supreme Court in
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that a particular constitutional error may so undermine the reliability of
the fact finding process that the reviewing court must presume that the
error was prejudicial. 10 9 In Geders the seventeen-hour deprivation of the
defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel's assistance was so extreme
that the Supreme Court presumed that the error resulted in prejudice to
the defense." 0 In contrast, the deprivation at issue in Perry lasted only
fifteen minutes."' The Fourth Circuit properly concluded that the state
court's brief restriction of Perry's access to counsel did not so undermine
the reliability of the trial verdict to warrant automatic reversal." 2 The
Chapman found improper a rule requiring automatic reversal for all constitutional errors.
Id. at 22.
109. See id. at 23 (noting that deprivation of certain constitutional rights never consti-
tutes harmless error).
The Supreme Court repeatedly has observed that some constitutional errors are so likely
to result in prejudice that automatic reversal is necessary. See, e.g., United States v. Cronic,
466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984) (stating that denial of counsel is reversible error); Davis v. Alaska,
415 U.S. 308 (1974) (holding that denial of right to effective cross-examination requires
automatic reversal); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567 (1958) (finding introduction of
coerced confession into evidence reversible error); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 533 (1927)
(holding that subjecting defendant to trial before judge with pecuniary interest in conviction
constitutes reversible error).
110. Geders, 425 U.S. 80, 91. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing
length of deprivation of defendant's right to counsel in Geders).
111. Perry v. Leeke, 832 F.2d 837, 839 (4th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 594 (1989).
112. Id. at 841-845; see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967) (finding that
some constitutional errors are not so likely to result in prejudice to require automatic
reversal).
In Perry the dissenting justices insisted that when a court deprives the defendant of
assistance of counsel, the constitutional infirmity is presumptively prejudicial. Perry, 832
F.2d at 848. The dissenting justices failed to note, however, the Supreme Court's basis for
applying harmless error analysis to certain constitutional errors. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at
22 (finding some constitutional errors insignificant and unrelated to outcome of trial). The
Supreme Court has held that the purpose of the sixth amendment right to counel is to
ensure that the defendant will receive the assistance necessary to a fair trial. See supra notes
2-3 and accompanying text (discussing importance of counsel's role in adversary system of
criminal justice). Further, the Supreme Court has stated that a fair trial is one which
produces a reliable outcome. See Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 583 (1986) (concluding that
interest in fairness is satisfied and reviewing court should affirm judgment if court finds
that record of trial established guilt beyond reasonable doubt).
The dissent in Perry states that the Supreme Court consistently has held that deprivation
of the right to counsel warrants reversal. Perry, 832 F.2d at 850. In Coleman v. Alabama,
however, the Supreme Court found inquiry into harmful effect proper when the trial court
unconstitutionally denied the accused assistance of counsel. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S.
1, 10-11 (1970). See also Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 232 (1977) (finding violation of
defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel subject to harmless error analysis). But see
White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (finding deprivation of accused's right to
assistance of counsel reversible error); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1961)
(same). The Supreme Court, therefore, does not consider all violations of the sixth amend-
ment right to assistance of counsel presumptively prejudicial. See Moore, 434 U.S. at 232
(finding deprivation of right to counsel subject to harmless error analysis); Coleman, 399
U.S. at 10-11 (same). The proper inquiry for a reviewing court, the Supreme Court has
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Perry court, therefore, correctly inquired into the prejudicial effect of the
state court's bar order.113
Ipi considering whether the constitutional error in Perry resulted in
prejudice to the defendant, the Fourth Circuit, by requiring that Perry
demonstrate the prejudicial effect of the state court's bar order, improperly
applied the standards that the Supreme Court established in Strickland v.
Washington."4 Courts properly apply Strickland if a defendant claims that
counsel's performance was inadequate." 5 Strickland should not apply,
however, to situations when the court completely deprives the defendant
of counsel's assistance." 6 As the dissenting justices in Perry explain, the
Supreme Court premised the Strickland decision upon the fact that counsel
assisted the accused." 7 Courts typically presume that counsel's assistance
was effective rather than indulge in second-guessing of counsel's tactical
decisions.1 8 By contrast, when a court denies a defendant access to counsel,
counsel has not, in fact, assisted the accused." 9 Because counsel has
rendered no assistance whatsoever, the reviewing court cannot presume
effective assistance. 120 Furthermore, when a trial court impermissably de-
held, is whether the constitutional error sufficiently undermined the reliability of the fact
finding process to warrant automatic reversal. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 22-
23 (holding automatic reversal unnecessary where constitutional error insignificant to outcome
of trial); supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's determination
in Perry that bar order did not sufficiently undermine reliability of trial verdict to require
automatic reversal).
113. See Perry, 832 F.2d at 841-843; supra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing
propriety of inquiry into prejudicial effect of certain constitutional errors). The Perry court
need not have relied exclusively on the Supreme Court's decision in Strickland v. Washington
as support for rejecting a rule of automatic reversal. Perry, 832 F.2d at 841-843; Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984). In concluding that Strickland compelled inquiry into
the prejudicial effect of the state court's bar order, the Perry court reasoned that Strickland
emphasized that the sixth amendment is necessary to the reliability of a trial verdict. Perry,
832 F.2d at 841-843; see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (finding purpose of sixth amendment
to ensure accused fair trial). The Supreme Court, however, has applied harmless error
analysis to a variety of constitutional errors and in each instance the court has focused its
inquiry on the reliability of the trial verdict. See Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 372-
378 (1972) (finding that admission of confession obtained in violation of defendant's sixth
amendment rights did not contribute to conviction, and, therefore, was harmless error);
Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 251-254 (1969) (holding violation of defendant's
rights under confrontation clause of sixth amendment insignificant to trial verdict and, thus,
harmless error); see also Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 230-232 (1973) (finding that
erroneous admission of testimony constituted harmless error).
114. See infra notes 120-127 and accompanying text (discussing impropriety of standards
applied by Perry court in considering prejudicial effect of bar order).
115. See infra notes 118-126 and accompanying text (discussing Strickland's applicability
to cases involving ineffective assistance of counsel).
116. Id.
117. Perry, 832 F.2d at 848.
118. Id. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing basis for presumption of
effective assistance).
119. Perry, 832 F.2d at 848.
120. Id. The Perry dissent explained that in Strickland the Supreme Court determined
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prives a defendant of counsel's assistance, the constitutional error is
attributable to the court. 12' Because the government is responsible for the
constitutional infirmity, the reviewing court requires that the prosecution
either demonstrate lack of prejudicial effect or suffer a reversal of the
trial verdict. 22 As the Surpeme Court observed in Strickland, however,
when defense counsel has rendered ineffective assistance neither the trial
court nor the prosecution is responsible for and, thus, able to prevent the
constitutional error. 23 Accordingly, the reviewing court places the burden
of demonstrating prejudice upon the defendant.
24
Rather than apply Strickland, the Fourth Circuit should have applied
the standards for determining prejudice the Supreme Court pronounced
in Chapman v. California.25 In Chapman the Supreme Court held that
when the state or a court commits constitutional error, the prosection
bears the burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error was harmless. 26 Accordingly, the prosecution in Perry bore the
burden of showing that the state court's bar order did not result in
prejudice to Perry's defense. 27 The Fourth Circuit, therefore, erroneously
required Perry to demonstrate the prejudicial effect of the bar order.
2
In concluding that the state court's bar order did not result in prejudice
to the defendant, the Fourth Circuit asserted that overwhelming evidence
indicated Perry's guilt. 29 The court reasoned that the prosecution at Perry's
trial had established the defendant's presence at the scene of the crime. 30
In finding the prosecution's evidence so convincing, however, the Fourth
that when defense counsel actually assists the accused, the court presumes that counsel
performed competently. Id. at 847. The Supreme Court in Strickland required the defendant
to overcome the court's presumption of effective assistance by demonstrating that counsel
performed inadequately. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
121. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692-693 (noting government responsibility for depri-
vation of right to counsel).
122. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (finding that prosecution bears
burden of proving constitutional error was harmless).
123. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692-693. The Supreme Court in Strickland distinguished
cases involving ineffective assistance of counsel from cases involving denial of counsel. Id.
Actual ineffective assistance of counsel, the Strickland court observed, results in a consti-
tutional infirmity attributable to defense counsel. Id.
124. See id. at 693 (holding that defendant bears burden of proving that counsel's
ineffective assistance resulted in prejudice).
125. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). See supra notes 99-101, 107-108 and accompanying text
(discussing Supreme Court's inquiry into prejudice in Chapman).
126. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. See supra notes 98-108 and accompanying text (discussing
Supreme Court's harmless error analysis in Chapman).
127. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 (holding that beneficiary of error bears burden of
establishing harmlessness).
128. Perry, 832 F.2d at 843-845.
129. Id. at 843-844.
130. Id. The Fourth Circuit in Perry noted that tire tracks from Perry's car and Perry's
footprints were found at the scene of the crime. Id. at 843. Further, Perry's fingerprint was
found on the victim's car. Id.
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Circuit failed to appreciate the thrust of Perry's defense.", Perry did not
contest his presence during the events constituting the crimes charged.
13 2
Rather, Perry presented a duress defense, claiming that he was an unwilling
participant in the events leading to his conviction. 3  The deprivation of
Perry's right to assistance of counsel occurred just prior to the defendant's
cross-examination. 3 4 Because demonstrating Perry's credibility to the jury
was essential to Perry's defense, counsel's assistance during the fifteen
minute trial recess might have benefitted Perry's case by improving his
performance on cross-examination. 35 The nature of Perry's defense, there-
fore, required that the Fourth Circuit attach sufficient weight to the
ramifications of the trial court's bar order.
3 6
The Fourth Circuit, nevertheless, properly may have concluded that
the state court's bar order did not contribute to Perry's conviction. 37 The
Perry court observed that the defendant had access to counsel during a
luncheon recess immediately before his direct testimony and again during
his direct testimony.13 Moreover, the Fourth Circuit noted that Perry took
full advantage of his rights on cross-examination, resisting the prosecutor's
attempt to discredit his story and relating his own version of events to
the jury. 139 In effect the Fourth Circuit may have determined, in accordance
with Chapman, that the constitutional error in Perry was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt. 40 However, the Fourth Circuit in Perry erred by
affirming the defendant's conviction without expressly finding that the
131. See infra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's failure in
Perry to recognize irrelevance of evidence concerning defendant's presence at scene of crime).
132. Perry, 832 F.2d at 844.
133. Id. Perry maintained that he was an unwilling participant in the events constituting
the offenses charged. Id. The tire tracks, footprints, and fingerprints, therefore, were
essentially irrelevant to the issues presented at Perry's trial. Id. Instead, the truth or falsity
of Perry's story was the salient issue. Id. It appears, therefore, that the Fourth Circuit
erroneously concluded that overwhelming evidence indicated Perry's guilt. Id. The Perry
court failed to point to any evidence attacking the credibility of the defendant's story. Id.
134. Perry, 832 F.2d at 839.
135. Id. at 848-849. Judge Winter, dissenting in Perry, maintained that counsel's
assistance prior to a defendant's cross-examination may be critical to the defense. Id. For
instance, the dissent noted, counsel might remind the accused of his rights on cross-
examination. Id. Further, counsel's ability to calm the defendant may have a significant
effect on the demeanor of the accused on the stand. Id.
136. See supra notes 134-135 and accompanying text (discussing trial court's deprivation
of defendant's right to counsel at critical juncture in Perry's trial).
137. See infra notes 138-140 and accompanying text (discussing improbability that state
court's bar in Perry resulted in prejudice).
138. Perry, 832 F.2d at 842.
139. Id. at 843-844 n.2. The Fourth Circuit observed in Perry that the defendant never
maintained that counsel failed to explain Perry's rights on cross-examination during the
numerous recesses in which the trial court allowed consultation. Id. at 843.
140. Id. at 844. In Perry the Fourth Circuit concluded that the vigor of Perry's
representation, the brevity of the bar order at issue, and frequent consultation between
Perry and counsel made the danger of prejudicial effect extremely remote. Id.
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state court's bar order was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 4 '
On appeal the United States Supreme Court in Perry held that the
state court's bar order did not violate the defendant's sixth amendment
right to assistance of counsel. 42 The Supreme Court in Perry admitted the
factual similarity between Geders v. United States and Perry v. Leeke,
but distinguished Geders by noting that the trial court's bar order in
Geders precluded the defendant from consulting with counsel during an
overnight recess. 43 The Perry Court observed that during an overnight
recess counsel and the defendant normally confer about matters that go
beyond the defendant's testimony. 44 In contrast, the Supreme Court
continued, during a short recess in the midst of the defendant's testimony,
as in Perry, the Court may presume that counsel and the defendant will
discuss nothing but the defendant's testimony. 45 The Perry Court con-
cluded that a defendant has no constitutional right to consult with counsel
in the midst of the defendant's testimony and, therefore, held that the
state court's order barring communication between Perry and defense
counsel during the fifteen minute recess occurring prior to Perry's cross-
examination did not violate the sixth amendment.146 The Supreme Court
in Perry reasoned that cross-examination of an'uncounseled defendant is
more likely to lead to discovery of the truth than cross-examination of a
defendant who has consulted with counsel following direct examination. 47
Accordingly, the Supreme Court in Perry held that the defendant did not
have a constitutional right to consult with counsel during the fifteen
minute trial recess and, therefore, affirmed Perry's conviction. 48
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Perry, asserted that the majority opinion
improperly concluded that the state court's bar order did not unconstitu-
tionally deprive the defendant of counsel's assistance. 149 Instead, the Perry
141. See id. at 838-845 (failing to find that state court's bar order was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt).
142. Perry v. Leeke, 57 U.S.L.W. 4075, 4078 (1989).
143. Id. at 4078; see supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text (discussing length of
deprivation of defendant's right to counsel in Geders).
144. Perry, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4078; see Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 88 (1976)
(noting matters counsel and accused discuss during overnight recess).
145. Perry, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4078. In Perry the Supreme Court concluded that during
a short recess a defendant and counsel will likely discuss the defendant's testimony and,
therefore, the trial court should have discretion in considering whether to allow the consul-
tation. Id. The Perry Court reasoned that cross-examination is more likely to lead to the
discovery of truth if defense counsel does not discuss the defendant's testimony with the
defendant prior to cross-examination. Id. Furthermore, the Perry court observed, permitting
the defendant to consult with counsel and, perhaps, the opportunity to regain his poise
undermines the prosecution's ability to effectively conduct cross-examination. Id.
146. Id. at 4078.
147. Id. The Supreme Court in Perry concluded that allowing the defendant to consult
with counsel following direct examination but prior to cross-examination would impede the
truth-finding function of the trial. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 4079-4082.
1989]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:467
dissent maintained that any order precluding consultation between counsel
and the accused during a trial recess violates the sixth amendment. 150 The
dissent in Perry observed that the Supreme Court consistently has held
that a criminal defendant has the right to assistance of counsel at every
critical stage of the adversary process.' Furthermore, the Perry dissent
noted, the Supreme Court has recognized that the right to counsel enhances
the reliability of the truthfinding process by enabling the defendant to put
the prosecution's case to a meaningful adversarial test. 5 2 Finding that any
trial recess is a critical stage in the criminal proceeding, the Perry dissent
concluded that the state court's bar order violated Perry's sixth amendment
right to assistance of counsel. 3 Accordingly, the dissent in Perry would
have reversed the defendant's conviction.1
4
In Perty the Supreme Court distinguished the Court's decision in
Geders on the grounds that, like any other witness, a defendant has no
right to consult with counsel while the defendant is testifying.'55 As the
Perry dissent properly observed, however, Perry did not seek to interrupt
his testimony to consult with counsel.5 6 Rather, the trial court called the
fifteen minute recess. 5 7 The Supreme Court in Perry failed to recognize
150. Id. at 4079; see Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 92 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (finding majority's holding that bar order was unconstitutional fully applicable
to any order barring consultation at trial recess). In Perry Justice Marshall rejected the
majority's determination that Geders was distinguishable from Perry. Id. at 4079-4081. The
Perry dissent observed that in Geders the Supreme Court determined that the proper inquiry
was not whether trial recesses normally occur during the defendant's testimony, but whether
consultation with counsel normally occurs during trial recesses. Id. at 4079; see Geders, 425
U.S. at 91 (holding that order barring consultation during overnight recess when counsel
and accused normally would confer was unconstitutional). The dissent in Perry maintained
that the sixth amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the opportunity to consult with
counsel at every step in the adversary proceeding, so long as that communication will not
impede the progress of the trial. Perry, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4079; see infra note 151 and
accompanying text (discussing right of accused to assistance of counsel at every critical stage
in criminal proceeding).
151. Perry, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4079; see Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)
(holding that accused has sixth amendment right to counsel at every step in adversary
process); see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (same); Hamilton v.
Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961) (same). In Perry the dissent maintained that the state
court's bar order deprived Perry of counsel's assistance at a critical juncture in Perry's trial.
Perry, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4082. The dissent in Perry noted that the defendant was mildly
retarded and suffered from an inability to cope with stressful situations. Id. at 4081 n.6.
The Perry dissent concluded that the order precluding consultation between counsel and the
defendant may have impaired Perry's ability to testify truthfully and effectively on cross-
examination. Id.
152. Perry, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4080; see supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing
Supreme Court decisions holding that right to counsel is vital to reliability of adversary fact
finding process); supra note 151 (discussing Perry dissent's conclusion that bar order in
Perry may have adversely affected defendant's ability to testify truthfully).
153. Perry, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4079-4082.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 4077.
156. Id. at 4079.
157. Id.
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that, as the Court previously has observed, a defendant is not like any
other witness.' s8 The Supreme Court has noted that frequently a defendant
must discuss matters with counsel that go beyond the defendant's testi-
mony.' s9 The Perry majority, nevertheless, distinguished the seventeen hour
recess at issue in Geders from the fifteen minute recess at issue in Perry,
reasoning that any discussion that might have taken place during the short
recess in Perry would have concerned the defendant's pending testimony. 160
The Supreme Court in Perry, however, offered no support for the prop-
osition that during a short trial recess a defendant and counsel have
nothing to discuss but the defendant's testimony. 61 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court in Perry did not provide a rational basis for the Court's
holding that Perry had no constitutional right to consult with counsel
during the fifteen minute trial recess.
62
The Supreme Court in Perry determined that a line of constitutional
significance lies somewhere between a seventeen hour deprivation of coun-
sel and a fifteen minute deprivation of counsel. 163 As the dissent in Perry
observed, however, the Perry majority failed to provide a standard of
evaluation by which a reviewing court may discern the proper point of
demarcation.'6 Consequently, neither trial courts nor appellate courts will
have a means for ascertaining whether a bar order of particular duration




In Perry v. Leeke the Fourth Circuit properly concluded that the state
court's order precluding consultation between counsel and the accused
158. See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 88 (1976) (noting that, unlike nonparty
witness, defendant often must discuss matters with counsel that go beyond defendant's
testimony); supra notes 70-75 (discussing Supreme Court's decision in Geders).
159. See Geders, 425 U.S. at 88 (observing matters other than defendant's testimony
that counsel and defendant discuss during trial recesses). As the dissent in Perry noted,
counsel and the accused often consult during trial about matters other than the defendant's
upcoming testimony. Perry, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4081. The Perry dissent properly observed that
the Supreme Court failed to express a logical basis for the Court's conclusion that during
relatively short trial recesses counsel and the defendant do not discuss matters such as trial
tactics or the availability of other witnesses. Id.
160. Perry, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4078; see supra note 145 and accompanying text (discussing
Supreme Court's determination in Perry that Court may presume that during brief trial
recesses occurring in midst of defendant's testimony, counsel and defendant will discuss
defendant's testimony).
161. Perry, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4077-4078; see supra note 159 and accompanying text
(discussing Perry Court's failure to support the Court's conclusion that Perry and counsel
had nothing to discuss during fifteen minute trial recess other than defendant's testimony).
162. Perry, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4077-4078.
163. Id. at 4077.
164. Id. at 4082. In Perry the Supreme Court left to the discretion of the trial judge
whether to permit consultation between counsel and the accused during a short trial recess.
Id. at 4078. The Perry Court, however, did not provide any guidance for courts to determine




WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:467
during a fifteen minute trial recess violated the defendant's sixth amend-
ment right to assistance of counsel. 66 In reviewing the Fourth Circuit's
decision, the Supreme Court in Perry departed from prior Supreme Court
precedent recognizing that a defendant's right to assistance of counsel at
every critical stage in the criminal proceedings is central to a defendant's
sixth amendment right to counsel. 67 Moreover, the Supreme Court in
Perry failed to provide an analytical framework by which reviewing courts
can determine the constitutional implications of an order barring consul-
tation between counsel and the accused during a trial recess. 68 Had the
Supreme Court in Perry concluded that the state court's bar order violated
the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel, the Supreme Court
probably would have determined that the constitutional error warranted
inquiry into prejudicial effect. 69 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit in Perry
properly concluded that the state court's bar order required inquiry into
prejudice.1 70 In considering the prejudicial effect of the bar order, however,
the Fourth Circuit failed to apply the proper standards for determining
when a defendant has suffered prejudice.17' When the court or the pros-
ecution engages in conduct resulting in a constitutional error, the reviewing
court should not require that the defendant demonstrate prejudicial ef-
fect. 72 Instead, the prosecution should bear the burden of establishing
that the error did not undermine the integrity of the jury's verdict and,
thereby, impinge upon the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial.'17
KAREN EILEEN HAVENS
166. See supra notes 69-82 and accompanying text (discussing propriety of Fourth
Circuit's conclusion that state court's bar order in Perry was unconstitutional).
167. See supra notes 150-152, 158-159 and accompanying text (discussing counsel's role
in criminal proceeding); supra note 2 and accompanying text (same).
168. See supra notes 163-165 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's failure
in Perry to establish standards by which reviewing courts can determine the constitutional
implications of bar orders).
169. See supra notes 99-113 and accompanying text (discussing propriety of considering
prejudicial effect of order barring consultation between counsel and the accused during
short trial recess).
170. See supra notes 49-53, 99-113 and accompanying text (discussing Perry court's
conclusion that bar order required inquiry into prejudice).
171. See supra notes 120-127 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's flawed
analysis of prejudicial effect of bar order).
172. See supra notes 125-127 and accompanying text (discussing Chapman requirement
that beneficiary of error demonstrate harmlessness).
173. See supra notes 114-128 (discussing proper standards for determining prejudicial
effect of constitutional error).
